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K Y B E R N E T I K A — V O L U M E 14 (1978), NUMBER 2 
Nash and Stackelberg Solutions 
to General Linear-Quadratic 
Two-Player Difference Games 
Part II. Open-Closed Strategies 
R A I M O P. H A M A L A I N E N 
This paper deals with difference games in which the information structures of the players 
are not equal. Nash and Stackelberg solutions to deterministic linear-quadratic two-player 
difference games are presented. The open-closed strategies are considered where one of the 
players can only use the initial state whereas the other has access to perfect memory information 
of the state. Stackelberg open-closed strategies are treated only in the case where the leader has 
access to open-loop information. A combined dynamic programming and augmentation techni-
ques approach is developed. A computationally straightforward recursive algorithm is derived 
for the Nash open-closed solution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the first part of this paper [1] we studied game problems in which the information 
structures of the players were always equal. However, games with unequal informa-
tion structures are also quite important because corresponding situations can easily 
occur in practice. Interesting game problems arise when the information structures 
of the players are no more equal. One of the players may for example have access 
to a perfect memory information set while the other player may only use the initial 
state vector when making his decision. This is just one possibility, more generally, 
the players could have different periodic information structures [2]. However, in the 
following we shall be restricted to the former situation. In the Nash problem both 
players may have either of the information structures whereas the Stackelberg problem 
is solved only when the follower has access to perfect memory information and the 
leader to open-loop information. In the opposite case, algorithms for the Stackelberg 
strategies are not found because stagewise solution techniques remain no more appli-
cable when the leader plays a closed-loop strategy. Previously corresponding difference 
games where the players have different information structures have only been treated 
by Basar [3]. Foley and Schmitendorf [4] have presented some results on the conti-
nuous-time Nash open-closed problem with a special type of quadratic cost functional 
2. OPEN-CLOSED SOLUTIONS 
Let the system be again given by the linear equation 
(2+) x(k + 1) = A(k) x(k) + B.(fc) u(k) + B2(k) v(k) 
where x(k) e R", u(fc) e Rp and u(fc) e R« for all keK, K = {0, 1, . . . , JV - l} . The 
cost function which player *' tries to minimize is of the following general quadratic 
form 
(2.2) J,- = ix'(iV) Si x(N) + iZ[x T ( fe ) Gf(/c) x(fc) + 2x
r(fc) M;i(/c) M(/c) + 
k = 0 
+ 2xr(/c) M,2(fc) D(fc) + u
T(k) Rn(k) u(k) + 2u
r(k)Ni(k) v(k) + 
+ vT(k)Ri2(k)v(k)], J = 1,2, 
where S,-, Qt(k), Rij(k) i + j , i,j = 1,2 are symmetric positive semidefinite matrices 
and Rji(/c), i = 1,2 are symmetric positive definite matrices for all keK. The system 
and weighting matrices are time-varying and of appropriate dimensions (see [1]). 
Considering now the game (2A), (2.2) where player 1 has access to the open-loop 
information set and player 2 to the perfect-memory information set. Solution of such 
a game may be initiated by first considering the strategy of player 2 when the control 
of player 1 is fixed to an arbitrary open-loop strategy u°(k). At this point it is not 
yet necessary to know to what solution concept the open-loop strategy u°(k) is related. 
Moreover, the form of the optimization problem that player 2 has to solve when 
choosing his closed-loop strategy will be the same even if he plays a Nash strategy 
or if he plays a Stackelberg follower's strategy. Thus it is possible to determine first 
the general solution to the optimization problem of player 2. 
The control of player 2 that minimizes J2 with u(k) = u°(k) can be shown (see 
Appendix) to be the following affine feedback strategy, provided the required in-
verses exist: 
(2.3) v*(k) = - G2 \k) F2(k) x(k) + t(k), 
where t(k) is a o-vector defined by 
(2.4) t(k) = - G2 \k) [E2(k) u°(k) + B
T
2(k) s(k)] 
which depends on the initial state vector through the open-loop strategy of player 1. 
The n-vector s(k) is given by the recursive equation 
(2.5) s(k) = K2(k + 1) u°(k + 1) + (A
0 (k + 1))T s(k + 1), s(N - 1) = 0 
where 




2(k) G2 \k) E2(k), K2(N) = 0 
and 
(2.7) A°(k) = A(k) - B2(k) G2 \k) F2(k), A°(N) = 0 . 
Matrices G2(k), E2(k), E2(k) and F2i(k) appearing above are defined in terms of 
P2(k + 1) by the following equations 
(2.8) G2(k) = R22(k) + B
T(k) P2(k + 1) B2(k) 




2(k) P2(k + 1) A(k) 




2(k) P2(k + 1) Bt(k) 
(2.11) F2i(k) = M
T
2i(k) + B\(k) P2(k + 1) A(k). 
The matrix P2(k) is obtained from the solution of the symmetric matrix Riccati 
difference equation 
(2.12) P2(k) - Q2(k) + A
T(k) P2(k + 1) A(k) -
- [MT22(k) + B
T
2(k) P2(k + 1) A(k)Y [R12(k) + B
T
2(k) P2(k + 1) B2(k + ! ) ] - ' . 
. [AfL(fc) + BT2(k) P2(k + l)A(k)] 
with P2(N) = S2. 
This solution gives a closed-loop strategy because the t(k) term in the feedback 
equation (2.3) is a function of the initial state vector. Hence player 2 is assumed to 
have access to the perfect memory information set. 
Sufficient conditions for the existence of the solution are that B22(k) is positive 
definite and that S2, Q2(k) and [Q2(k) - M22(k) R22(k) M
T
22(k)\ are positive semi-
definite matrices for all keK. Now G2(k) will clearly be nomingular for all keK 
since R22(k) > °> for all keK, and S2 ^ 0 implies that P2(N - 1 ) ^ 0 which again 
guarantees that P2(N - 2), P2(N - 3), . . . , P2(0) will be positive semidefinite as can 
be concluded by the following equivalent expression for the Riccati-equations 
(2-12): 
(2.13) P2(k) = Q2(k) - M22(k) R22\k) M
T
22(k) + 
+ [A(k) - B2(k) R22\k) M
T
22(k)Y . 
. [P2(k + 1) - P2(k + l)B2(k)(R22(k) + B
T
2(k)P2(k + l)B2(k)Y
l B2(k)P2(k + 1)] 
. [A(k) - B2(k) R22\k) M
T
22(k)] . 
The above defined matrices P2(k), K2(k) and A°(k) appear as weightings in the 
optimal cost-to-go of player 2 when it is expressed in the following form 
(2.14) J$(k) = i[xT(k) P2(k) x(k) + 2x
T(k) K2(k) u°(k) + 2s
T(k) A°(k) x(k)] + 
+ /(2t ,(*o), 
where l2
k) (x0) is a scalar function of the initial state. One may note that for a zero-
control of player 1, when u(k) = 0 for all k e K, (2.3) and (2.14) results in the solution 
of the remaining optimal regulator problem. This is naturally something that one 
would have expected to occur. 
As the strategy of player 2 will always be given by (2.3) when player 1 uses any 
open-loop strategy u°(k), we can proceed in the problem solution by substituting 
(2.3) in the system equation and by expressing the cost function of player 1 in terms 
of the initial state vector. After the substitution we have 
(2.15) x(k + 1) = A°(k) x(k) + BA(k) u(k) + B2(k) t(k). 
Introducing now the augmented vectors x, x0 and u defined in Chapter 3 of the first 
part of this paper [ l ] together with the qN-vector t 
(2.16) 1 A [tT(0)\tT(l)\ ... \tT(N - t ) ] r , 
the system equation (2.1) can be written with the aid of the auxiliary control variable ( 
in the form 
(2.17) x = A°x0 + 5?M + B°2t, 
where A0 is a block diagonal nN x nN-matrix. It is defined analogously to A by eq. 
(3.6) in [1] when <P(k, I) is replaced by <P°(k, l) which is the fundamental matrix 
associated with (2A5) i.e. we have now 
(2.18) <P°(k, /) = A°(k - l)A°(/c - 2)- . . . -A°(l), k>l 
and 
<P°(k, k) =1. 
Similarly, B° and B2 are defined by eq. (3.8) in [ l ] when the <P(k, I) matrices are 
replaced by <P°(k, I) matrices respectively for all A: and /. 
The cost function of player 1 when v(k) = v*(k) can readily be written by employ-
ing these augmented vectors: 
(2.19) J? = i[xTQ°x + 2xTM°11u + 2x
TM°12t + u
r R n S + 2U
TN°1t + 






The augmented weighting matrices Q°uM^M
0^,R°1U N°uR°12, Q°01,M011 andM°012 
are again defined analogously to Qx, Mn, M1 2 , R1U N2, R12, Q01, M 0 1 1 and M0 1 2 
using (3.10)-(3.15) in [1]. Particularly some of the matrices remain unchanged: 
R n S R n , J V ^ i V j , R?2 = R12. 
The other weighting matrices are obtained by modifying the definitions of the 
corresponding original weightings so that the block matrices Q^k), Mir(k)and M12(k) 
are replaced by Q?(fc), M°xl(k) and M°12(k) respectively for each ke K when 





+ FT2(k) G2\k) R12(k) G2\k) F2(k) 
(2.21) M?t(fc) - Mlx(fc) - E2
r(fc) G2 \k) N\k) 
(2.22) M?2(fc) = M12(/c) - F
T
2(k) G2\k) R12(k) . 
Thus the block structure and the dimensions of the matrices are not changed. 
The dynamic game problem faced by player 1 has now been brought into a form 
(2.19) and (2.15) which allows the derivation of the open-loop strategies of player 
1 subject to the closed-loop strategy of player 2 both in the Nash and Stackelberg 
cases. 
2.1. The Nash Open-Closed Solution 
The game problem of player 1 is now to solve the static minimization problem with 
the cost given in terms of the initial state vector by (2.19) subject to the constraint 
(2.15) Due to the assumed Nash solution concept the minimization of J? with respect 
to w is not affected by the terms that only depend on t although t becomes a function 
of the Nash strategy of player 1. 
Direct derivation of J? in (2.19) yields then 
(2.23) «* = (G?)-1 [Fix, + £?.] , 
where 
(2.24) G? = R?t + (B{y M°U + i(M°ny + (Ely g°] s ? , 
(2.25) n = (M°011y + [ (M?o
r + (siy g?] A0 , 
(2.26) i ? = m + (Eiy M°12 + [ ( M ? O
T + m T g?] B°2 . 
The open-loop solution w* in (2.22) is still in an implicit form as the elements 
of t are t(k) vectors which were defined in terms of the open-loop strategy of player 1. 
Hence we have to identify these strategies with each other and solve the resulting 
linear matrix equation. The recursion (5.5) yields the linear relationship between 
sandw0 
(2.27) 5 = K2U° , 
where 
(2.28) Š° 4 [(S° (o))
г; (S° (i))
г; .. .\(s°(N-ïfУY, 
(2.29) ӣ ° â [ ( t ť W K " W ; - . . ; ( « ° ( І V - I ) ) T 
and the n x p block elements of K2, an nN x pN matrix, are given by 
(2.30) [K2]kl A | 
($°(l - 1, fc))riC2(/ - 1) for k < l 
0 else 
whenfc, I = 1,2, . . . , J V . 
Further by the definition of t(k) we have 
(2.31) t = -Luu° - Lss, 
where Lu and Ls are gN x pN and qiV x niV block diagonal matrices, respectively, 
given by the q x p blocks 
(2.32) \Lu\k = G-2\k-\)E2{k- 1) 
and by the q x n blocks 
(2.33) [Ls]kk=G2
l(k-l)BT2(k-l) 
for k = 1,2, . . . , J V . 
Combining these two equations (2.27) and (2.31) yields the linear dependence of t 
on u° 
(2.34) ? = - [ L „ + L,K] M° = -L,«° 
where L, becomes an upper block triangular matrix. 
The Nash open-loop strategy y*(x0) for player 1 results from (2.23) after the sub-
stitution of t by - L , M * provided that the required inverses exist: 
(2.35) u* = y*(x0) = - [ G ? - E^L,]"
1 F?x0 . 
The obtained solution u* yields a linear strategy yf)*(x0) for player 1 at each stage. 
Correspondingly the closed-loop strategy of player 2 in this Nash open-closed game 
will be a linear function of the current time and initial state vectors at each stage. 
This closed-loop strategy v*(k) = y<2)*(x(k), x0) is naturally obtained from (2.3) 
when we set u°(k) = y[k)*(x0) in (2.4) and (2.5). 
It is clear that the Nash open-closed game, where player 1 plays closed-loop and 
player 2 open-loop, is solved in an analogous manner only by changing the roles 
of u and v. 
2.2. The Stackelberg Open-Closed Solution 
As was pointed out before the general form of the closed-loop strategy of player 2, 
the follower, is the affine strategy (2.3) for all open-loop strategies of player 1, the 
leader. The Stackelberg solution concept implies that the leader knows what the 
strategy of the follower will be after the leader has decided his own strategy. This 
means that the leader takes into account the dependence of the t(k) term appearing 
in the follower's strategy on his own strategy u(k). 
The open-loop strategy for the leader is thus obtained by minimizing J° in (2.19) 
with respect to u subject to the system equation (2.15) and to the equation 
(2.36) t= -Lfi. 
These constraints mean that, unlike in the Nash case, all the terms in J° except 
for xlQ01x0 enter the optimization problem. 
The solution is again first determined in the implicit form 
(2.37) u* = - [ G ? - L ^ Y ] " 1 m - LjF°12)x0 + (E? - LjG°12)t-] 
where 
(2.38) G12 = R°12 + (BIY M 1 2 + [(Ml2Y + (B\Y S°] B°2 , 
(2.39) F°12 = (M°012Y + [(M°12Y + (BlY g?] A° . J 
The open-loop strategy can then be directly solved after setting t = —Lfi* which 
yields 
(2.40) u* = y*(x0) = - [ G ° + L]G\2Lt - L](E\Y E\L^ [F° - LtF°12] x0 . 
It is again assumed that the required inverses exist. Thus the Stackelberg open-closed 
solution becomes a linear strategy of the initial state for the leader and a linear 
strategy of the current time state and the initial state for the follower. 
The above presented solution techniques for the Nash and Stackelberg open-closed 
strategies may at first sight seem very complicated. However, the procedures are 
in principle quite straightforward. Firstly the Riccati-equation for P2(k) is solved 
backwards in time starting from the last stage with P2(N) = S2. This can be done 
independently since the equation (2.12) for P2(k) is not coupled with any equations 
related to the strategies of player 1, Secondly the solution to P2(k) determines the 
matrices needed in (2.35) and (2.40) and the open-loop strategies of player 1 are 
obtained after performing the matrix inversions and multiplications. Thirdly the 
closed-loop strategies of player 2 are given by equation (5.3) when t(k) is taken from 
(5.29) with u°(k) replaced by yf*(x0). 
The major problems are again the computational difficulties which are due to the 
size of the matrices involved since their dimensions are proportional to the number 
of time points included. 
3. RECURSIVE ALGORITHMS 
Although the preceding open-closed solution algorithms for the Nash and Stackel-
berg games are partly given by low dimensional recursive equations, there remains, 
however, some operations which have to be performed using the augmented matrices. 
As it was already noted in [1] these will make the computations increasingly cumber-
some when the time interval becomes long. In this section we shall present a recursive 
algorithm for the solution of the Nash open-closed game, where the equations with 
augmented matrices have been replaced by low dimensional matrix difference equa-
tions. The Stackelberg open-loop solution can not, however, be put into an equally 
simple recursive form. 
We omit the rather complicated derivation of the following equations but it can 
be shown that the Nash open-closed solution (2.36), (2.3) is given in feedback form by 
(3.1) u*(k)=-Htt(k)x(k) 
(3.2) t*(k) =-H,(k)x(k), 
(3.3) v*(k) = -G2-\k) F2(k) x(k) + t*(k) = 
= -[G-\k)F2(k) + Ht(k)]x(k), 
where the feedback gains are 
(3.4) Hu(k) = [G.(fc) - Et(k) G3-\k) E3(k)]-
1 . 
. [F.(fc) - E,(k) G-2\k) F2(k) - £,(fc) G3\k) E3(fc)] , 
(3.5) H,(k) = [G3(fc) - E3(fc) G; \k) Et(k)] ~
1 . 
. [E3(fc) - E3(k) G-,\k) F,(k) + E3(k) Gl\k) E\(k) G-2\k) F2(k)] 
with 
(3.6) G.(fc) = i?u(fc) + B\(k) P,(fc + 1) Bt(k) , 
(3.7) F,(fc) = Mxt(fc) + B\k) P.(fc + 1) A(fc), 
(3.8) Et(k) = N,(k) + B\k) P,(k + 1) B2(k), 
(3.9) G3(k) = G2(k) - B
T
2(k) P3(k + 1) B2(k) , 
(3.10) E3(fc) = B
T
2(k) P3(k + 1) [B2(k) G2~ \k) F2(k) - A(/c)] , 
(3.11) E3(k) = E2(fc) - B
T
2(k) P3(k + 1) B.(fc). 
Matrices G2(fc), E2(fc) and E2(fc) in the above equations are defined in terms of 
J°2(fc + 1) by (2.8)-(2A0). All the three unknown matrices E^fc + l), E2(fc + l) 
and E3(fc + l) are obtained from the solutions of matrix difference equations. The 
symmetric Riccati equation for P2(k + l) was given in (2.12) and it does not depend 
on the pair of coupled asymmetric equations for Pj(fc + l) and P3(k + l ) : 
(3.12) P^k) = Q°(fc) - M°xl(k) Hu(k) - M?2(fe) H,(k) + 
+ (A0 (k)f P . (* + 1) [A°(fc) - B.(ft) Hu(k) - B2(k) Ht(k)] , 
(3.13) P3(fe) = Xa(fe) H„(fe) + (A
0 (fe)Y P3(k + 1). 
.[A%k) - Bl(k)Hu(k) - B2(k)Ht(k)] 
with 
Pi.(N) = S t and P3(N) = 0 
This pair of equations is moreover coupled with the solution of (5.7) since P2(k + l ) 
appears in the expressions for K2(k), Hu(k) and Ht(k). 
These equations provide a means for obtaining the Nash open-closed solution 
in a feedback form. The solution can be further developed so that its representation 
will correspond to the assumed information structures of the players. The control 
of player 1 and the auxiliary control variable t*(k) are given as open-loop strategies by 
(3.14) u*(k) = yf>*(x0) = -Hu(k) W°(k) x0 
and 
(3.15) t*(k) = y?*(x0)=-Ht(k)T°(k)x0 
where ¥°(k) satisfies the matrix difference equation 
(316) 
W°(k) = [A°(fc - 1) - B.(fc - 1) Hu(k - 1) - B2(k - 1) Ht(k - 1)] W°(k - 1) 
with the initial condition 
¥°(0) = I. 
Substituting (3.15) into (3.3) yields then the closed-loop strategy of player 2 
(3.17) v*(k) = yV*(x(k),x0) = 
= - G2\k) F2(k) x(k) - H,(k) <P°(k) x0 . 
Thus we have obtained a recursive algorithm to solve the Nash open-closed 
game. In the first phase the feedback gains Hu(k) and Ht(k) are solved. The recursion 
proceeds backwards in time starting from the last stage in such a manner that at stage 
fc we first evaluate Pt(k), P2(k) and P3(k) from equations (3.12). (2.12) and (3.13), 
whose right hand sides include only matrices known from the previous stage k + 1 . 
These matrices then determine the values of all the matrices needed at the next stage, 
k — 1. The other phase of the algorithm can be started when we have reached 
k = 0. Then, f°(k) is evaluated recursively in the forward direction from (3.16) 
and finally the solution strategies are obtained at each stage from (3.14) and (3.17). 
A comparison of this with the recursive algorithm for the Nash open-open game 
in [1] shows that here we have to solve three matrix difference equations instead 
of those two in the open-open game. However, in both cases there are only two 
coupled asymmetric matrix difference equations. It is interesting to note that the 
control problem of player 2, who plays a closed-loop strategy in the open-closed 
game, has certain characteristic features similar to those of the discrete-time linear-
quadratic tracking problem. The affine feedback law (2.3) has a noncausal property 
in the sense that the "tracking" term t(k) is a function of s(k), which again depends 
on s(k + 1). Further the independent Riccati difference equation (2.12) for P2(k) 
which determines the feedback gain in (2.3) is the same symmetric equation that is 
obtained in the linear-quadratic regulator and tracking problems. 
The form of this discrete-time Nash open-closed solution differs from the corres-
ponding continuous time solution presented by Foley and Schmitendorf [4] for a game 
with simpler quadratic cost functions. In their solution the closed-loop strategy 
of the other player is a pure feedback control-law, which does not depend explicitly 
on the initial state, unlike in this discrete-time case. On the basis of the results of [3] 
it can be concluded that the affine strategies for these open-closed games become 
unique when a random perturbation term is included in the system dynamics. 
4. CONCLUSION 
An approach using combined augmentation and dynamic programming techniques 
was developed for the solution of open-closed strategies in discrete-time linear-
quadratic differential games. The Stackelberg open-closed game is solved only in the 
case when the leader plays open-loop and the follower closed-loop. In the opposite 
case the solution is not available by the present techniques. The solution procedures 
for the Nash and Stackelberg solutions become in general much alike and their 
connections can be easily seen due to the unified notations used. A recursive computa-
tional algorithm, where the augmented matrix representations are replaced by re-
cursive difference equations, is derived for the Nash open-closed strategies. In this 
case we arrive at three matrix equations the symmetric one of which is the standard 
Riccati equation of optimal regulator problems and it becomes independent of the 
two other equations. The discrete-time Nash open-closed strategy becomes a function 
of the current time state and also of the initial state. This differs in form from the pure 
feedback strategy obtained in continuous-time open-closed games. Sufficient condi-
tions guaranteeing the existence of the presented solutions have not been developed. 
These remain as open question which are in general difficult to approach and espe-
cially the general forms of the cost functions make the analysis even more complicated. 
APPENDIX 
It will be shown by backward induction that the control of player 2, who plays 
closed-loop in the present open-closed game problem, is given by (2.3) when player 1 
uses an open-loop strategy u°(k). The optimization problem of player 2 can be solved 
recursively backwards by dynamic programming techniques because the current 
time state, which includes knowledge of all previous decisions, is available to player 2. 
Consider first stage At — 1. After the system equation (2.1) has been employed 
to eliminate x(N) from the cost-to-go J2(N - l), it is easily seen that the optimal 
decision of player 2 minimizing J2(At - l) is given by 
(A 1) v*(N - 1) = -G2
l(N - 1) [F2(N - 1) x(At - l) - E2(N - 1) u°(N - l)] . 
where G2(N - l), E2(At - l), and E2(N - l) are defined by (2.8), (2.9) and (2+0) 
with P2(N) = S2. Substituting (A l) into the cost-to-go and rearranging the terms 
results in the following expression 
(A 2) J*2(N - 1) = i[x
T(JV - 1) P2(N - 1) x(At - 1) + 2x
T(At - 1) . 
. K2(N - 1) u°(N - 1)] + i(u° (N - 1))
T T2(N - l) u°(N - l) 
where 
(A 3) P2(N - 1) = 
= Q2(N - 1) + A
T(N - 1) S2 A(N - 1) - E2(At - l) G2\N - l) F2(N - l), 
(A 4) K 2 ( A t - l ) = 
= M21(N - 1) + A
T(N - 1) S2 B,(N - 1) - F2(N - l) G2\N - l) E2(At - l) 
and 
(A 5) r 2 ( A t - i ) = 
= R2l(N - 1) + B
T(N - 1) S2 B,(N - 1) - E2(N - l) G2\N - l) E2(At - 1) . 
These results (A l) and (A 2) clearly agree with equations (2.3) and (2+4) for 
k = N - 1 since by (2.4) we have 
t(N - 1) = -G2\N - 1) E2(N - 1) u°(N - 1). 
It is next assumed that (2.3) and (2.14) are true for k = ' + 1,1 e K. The optimiza-
tion problem faced by player 2 at stage / is then to minimize the cost-to-go 
(A 6) J2(l) = i[x
T(/) Q2(/) x(/) + 2x
T(/) M21(/) u°(l) + 
+ 2xT(/) M22(/) v(l) + («° (l))
T R2l(l) u°(l) + 2(«° (/))
T N2(l) v(l) + 
+ vT(l) R22(l) v(l) + x
T(l + 1) P2(l + 1) x(/ + 1) + 
+ 2xT(Z + 1) K2(l + 1) u°(l + 1) + 2s
T(/ + 1) A°(l + 1) x(l + 1)] + /(2'>(x0) 
134 subject to 
(A 7) x(l + 1) = A(0 x(l) + 5 , (0 H ° ( 0 + 5 2 (0 v(l). 
In the cost function (A 6) there is a number of terms such as (u° (0 ) r R2i(0 "°(0 
and ?2
!)(xo) which do not enter the optimization problem since they depend solely 
on the initial state. In addition to u°(0, which was assumed to be an open-loop 
strategy, also s(l + 1) is a function of the initial state by definition, equation (2.5). 
The minimizing control v*(l) is readily seen to be the affine strategy 
(A 8) ,*(0 = 
= - [ R 2 2 ( 0 + Bl(l)P2(l + l)B2(l)]~




- [R2 2(0 + Bl(l)P2(l + l)B2(l)]-i [(Nl(l) + Bl(l)P2(l + l ) 5 x ( 0 ) u
o ( 0 + 
+ Bl(l) (K2(l + 1) u°(l + 1) + (A\l + l)f s(l + 1))] , 
which is the same as (2.3) with k = I. Inserting this optimal strategy (A 8) and x(l + l) 
from (A 7) into (A 6) results after some algebra in the expression for J*(0 which is 
of the form (2.14) with / = k. Thus the proof of our assertion is completed. 
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